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TEACHING POLICY INSTRUMENT CHOICE IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:                                    
THE FIVE P’S 
JAMES SALZMAN† 
Difficult choices lie at the heart of environmental law and policy. 
Should we reduce emissions of greenhouse gases? Should we protect 
a local population of endangered plants? Should we limit the catch in 
a fishery that seems in danger of collapsing? And if we take these 
actions, how much should we reduce the activity? Answering these 
questions is fascinating but no easy matter. It requires consideration 
of scientific, economic, legal, and political issues, not to mention the 
trade-offs that inevitably arise. 
And even if we can agree that emissions of a particular pollutant 
are too high, that grazing levels of the local commons must be 
reduced, or that a local endangered species requires greater 
protection, a fundamental choice still remains: We need to decide 
how best to achieve these goals.  
Put another way, even if we agree on our starting point and end 
point, we still need to determine which path should take us there. 
Reliance on regulatory mandates? Market instruments? Pilot projects 
or information generation? Implementing environmental policy is 
where the rubber meets the road, and it has provided some of the most 
innovative policy instruments in all of American law. 
While environmental law may appear dauntingly complex, and 
on occasion truly is, it turns out that understanding instrument choice 
can be straightforward. Perhaps surprisingly, there are only five basic 
policy instruments in play, and these can be effectively taught through 
a simple framework known as “The Five P’s.” 
Just as a complex sonata can be reduced to a small number of 
white and black piano keys, so can students’ mastery of the Five P’s 
allow them to identify the potential range of policy instruments at 
 
       †   Samuel F. Mordecai Professor of Law and Nicholas Institute Professor of Environmental 
Policy, Duke University. I am grateful to the many environmental law students over the years 
who have discussed and helped develop the Five P’s in class. 
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work in any statute. Despite their application across a dizzying range 
of situations, the basic environmental policy tools remain the same. 
The “Five P’s” include Prescriptive Regulation, Property Rights, 
Penalties, Payments, and Persuasion. There will rarely be one best 
tool for a particular situation, and much of the challenge in 
instrument choice lies in identifying each instrument’s particular 
advantages and disadvantages. 
The DELPF editors have kindly invited me to set out the Five 
P’s as a teaching tool for other instructors to consider. Easy to 
remember, over the years it has proven a user-friendly and effective 
approach in the classroom. In the sections below, I use the well-
known Tragedy of the Commons as a shared example.1 
1. PRESCRIPTIVE REGULATION2 
Prescriptive regulations mandate what parties can and cannot 
do—Thou Shalt or Thou Shalt Not. This is both the most direct and 
the most common form of environmental law. In the context of 
overgrazing the commons, for example, the government might limit 
the number of sheep that may graze, or restrict grazing to a particular 
season or period of time. 
We see prescriptive regulations at all levels of environmental 
governance—from hunting permits at the local level3 and effluent 
limits under the Clean Water Act at the national level4 to restrictions 
 
 1.  As legions of law students have learned, Garrett Hardin’s classic example of the 
tragedy of the commons is one of grazing sheep. In it, too many sheep are grazing on an open-
access commons, and unless something is done, the grass will soon be overgrazed and no sheep 
will be able to feed on the commons. Individual incentives encourage rapid depletion of the 
resource to the detriment of all—hence the tragedy. Government intervention becomes 
necessary because the problems of hold-outs (parties that are not willing to cooperate), free 
riders (parties that will do nothing but benefit from others’ contributions), and collective action 
(the transaction costs from bringing multiple parties together to seek agreement) make it 
infeasible for individual shepherds to come together and agree on a solution. See Garrett 
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
 2.  The following sections are adapted from JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON THOMPSON, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 47–53 (3d ed. 2010). 
 3.  See, e.g., 4 SANFORD, N.C. CODE OF ORDINANCES art. I, § 4-15 (2010) (requiring 
hunters seeking to conduct “urban archery deer hunting” to “have in their possession a valid 
North Carolina Hunting License showing completion of a hunting safety course” and to “hunt 
from an elevated platform of at least ten feet above ground.”) 
 4.  See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(a)(1) (2011) (“The permittee shall comply with effluent 
standards or prohibitions established under section 307(a) of the Clean Water Act . . . .”). 
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on foreign commerce in endangered species under the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species.5 
Also referred to as command-and-control regulation, prescriptive 
regulation can be very effective in mandating uniform compliance 
across all actors, preventing problems of hold-outs, free riders, and 
collective action. If implemented across a broad geographic area, it 
can also prevent a “race to the bottom,” in which regulated parties 
seek jurisdictions with less stringent requirements.6 
There is considerable debate, however, over the efficiency of 
prescriptive regulations.7 Economists, for example, often criticize 
them as inefficient and unwieldy. They argue that this approach 
provides little incentive for innovation because once the regulated 
party has satisfied the necessary requirement, the law creates no 
incentive to reduce harmful activities further. Once a company has 
reduced its emissions to the mandated limit of, for example, ten tons 
per year, there is no obvious benefit in further reducing emissions. 
Such regulations also tend to encourage reliance on traditional, 
proven control technologies rather than on pollution-prevention 
strategies and new technologies.8 “So long as the regulations require 
use of Filter X, we’ve bought Filter X, and it’s working properly,” a 
plant manager might reason, “there’s no need to go further.” 
It is important to note arguments that, by forcing better 
environmental performance, prescriptive regulations can actually 
increase efficiencies and productivity, often resulting in benefits to 
the company. Noted economist Michael Porter, for example, has 
argued that strict environmental regulation encourages production-
 
 5.  Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
art. II, § 4, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243. 
 6.  See generally Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a 
“Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997) (defending the validity of the 
“race to the bottom” theory). But cf. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: 
Rethinking the “Race-to-the-bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1210 (1992) (questioning the vitality of the race-to-the-bottom argument). 
 7.  Compare Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 
37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1333 (1985) (“The present regulatory system wastes tens of billions of 
dollars every year, misdirects resources, stifles innovation, and spawns massive and often 
counterproductive litigation.”), with Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: 
Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 
1267, 1331 (1985) (“In light of the inefficiencies associated with command-and-control 
standards, one could not conclude that uniform treatments are invariably superior to 
individualized decisionmaking, but that the opposite generalization is equally untenable.”). 
 8.  Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 420–21 
(1990). 
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process and design innovations.9 These cost savings, Porter contends, 
can exceed both compliance and innovation costs, resulting in greater 
competitiveness.10 
Two unstated assumptions behind prescriptive regulation merit 
mention. The first is that the regulator will set the standard at the 
proper level. This may not happen, either because of inadequate 
information or agency capture (a classic problem in the context of 
natural resources such as fish and timber, where industry pressure has 
led to overfishing and large-scale clearcutting).11 The second 
assumption is that the regulator will be able to monitor compliance 
with the standard. Both impose administrative costs, which, as a 
result, can sometimes be a good deal higher for prescriptive 
regulation than for other policy instruments. 
2. PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A classic solution to the tragedy of the commons is to privatize 
the resource by creating property rights. Using our grazing example, 
instead of an open-access commons, assume the field has now been 
divided into square parcels of land and allocated to individual 
shepherds, including you. You now have the right to exclude 
everyone else’s sheep from your parcel. Are you still as eager to 
overgraze as before? 
All of a sudden, your previous incentive to consume the resource 
as fast as possible (before everyone else does) is no longer relevant. 
Instead, your interests are best served by carefully tending your part 
of the commons so it remains productive long into the future—so it is 
sustainably managed. You may well charge other shepherds to use 
your parcel, or even let them on for free, but you would do so only to 
the extent that the resource base remains intact and productive—that 
is, so long as the resource is not overgrazed. In financial terms, to 
maximize profits you will safeguard your asset over the longer term. 
The same should be true whether the property rights are vested in 
 
 9.  See Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the 
Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 97 (1995) (presenting 
examples of instances where “environmental innovation produces net benefits for private 
companies”). 
 10.  Id. at 100 (“Thus the net cost of compliance can fall with stringency and may even turn 
into a net benefit.”). 
 11.  JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 219–20 (2d ed. 
2009). 
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individuals or in communities (as is the case in many indigenous 
cultures). 
The Law of the Sea provides a classic example of a property 
rights approach at the international level. In part to strengthen the 
sustainable management of fisheries, coastal states were given control 
over resources in the seas up to 200 nautical miles off their coasts, in a 
new jurisdiction known as the Exclusive Economic Zone.12 The global 
commons of the high seas was carved up, with countries given 
exclusive authority over the most productive areas off their coastlines. 
Compared to prescriptive regulation, this approach should have 
lower administrative costs. The government simply creates the 
property rights, allocates them initially, and steps back, leaving future 
allocations to the market. A number of commentators have called for 
far greater reliance on property-rights approaches to environmental 
protection. Sometimes called “Free Market Environmentalism,” this 
strategy would privatize as many environmental resources as possible, 
based on the belief that markets provide better resource-allocation 
mechanisms than government regulators.13 
Implicit in a property-rights approach is the importance of 
technology. To enforce your right to exclude, you need both to know 
someone is making use of your resource (an issue of monitoring 
capacity) and to have the ability to exclude others’ use. As an 
example, consider the history of the American West and its iconic 
cattle drive, where thousands of cattle were driven across the 
landscape to the railroad terminus where they could be shipped to 
market. A staple of Western films, this practice endured for only a 
few decades. The invention of barbed wire enabled settlers for the 
first time to exclude cattle effectively and affordably from trespassing 
across their lands.14 In a more modern context, decoders have allowed 
satellite television channels to privatize the airwave commons. Unless 
satellite-channel providers could exclude others’ use by scrambling 
their signals, there would be no way for them to sell their product, 
since people could use it for free. 
 
 12.  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 57, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397. 
 13.  See generally TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET 
ENVIRONMENTALISM (rev. ed. 2001) (advocating for the use of markets and property rights to 
implement environmental policies). 
 14.  See Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morris, The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice 
Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 131–32 
(2001) (relaying the history of barbed wire as an important technology in enforcing property 
rights). 
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Despite the increasing interest and application of property-rights 
approaches to environmental protection, they face some significant 
obstacles. The first is that many environmental resources are not 
easily amenable to commodification. When resources have significant 
public-goods aspects (such as major watersheds or biodiversity), 
privatization might not lead to the most socially beneficial use of the 
land. Private-property owners typically value only those uses that 
provide monetary remuneration. In these cases, the important 
positive externalities will not be valued. Perhaps the new owners of 
the commons wish to use it for mini-golf while the sheep starve and 
people go hungry. If the government wants to ensure the important 
public goals of a secure food supply, conservation of rare biodiversity, 
or buffers against flooding, it may need to step in and restrict the use 
of the land. Property-rights advocates would generally approve of this 
sort of government restriction, it should be noted, so long as the 
government pays the property holders for the corresponding loss in 
value. 
There may also be normative concerns that rub against 
privatization of national parks or other environmental amenities in 
the public domain. For example, the government could try to 
“privatize” wildlife by equipping each animal with a collar or tag that 
identifies its “owner.” As a result, though, collared wildlife would lose 
part of its “wildness,” the quality that gives it a unique and valuable 
identity.15 
Practically, there also are difficult allocation issues for the initial 
privatization of environmental resources. Using the commons as an 
example, assume that the government has divided up the land into 
fifty separate parcels. Whom should be given title? Should the land be 
auctioned to the highest bidder? This could favor wealthier 
newcomers and corporate interests. To give more respect to 
traditional users, perhaps the allocation could be based on historic 
use or current levels of consumption? Yet this would put newcomers 
at a disadvantage and favor those who have been the most profligate 
in the past. If we cannot decide among these competing users, should 
we just have a random drawing? Any allocation mechanism will tend 
to favor some groups at the expense of others. Inevitably, who should 
 
 15.  See Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species: The Importance of Being Wild, 23 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1999) (“Wildness, understood as unpredictability or freedom from 
human control, imparts an aura that cannot be duplicated by captive species. That aura attracts 
and inspires us. It makes us care about wild places and wild creatures, and leads us to believe 
they merit special protection.”). 
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be favored comes down to a contentious political decision, with 
winners and losers. 
A. Tradable Permits 
Prescriptive regulations can be combined with property rights 
through the use of tradable permits in environmental markets. Here, 
property rights are created for use of the resource—for the right to 
graze sheep in a certain area, emit a ton of sulfur dioxide, or catch a 
lobster, for example. Trading systems use the market to make 
prescriptive regulation more efficient. The government decides how 
much of a harmful activity to permit (just as it would with  
prescriptive regulations), awards private rights to engage in the 
activity up to the regulatory cap, and then permits those rights to be 
traded. The market does not play a role in determining the overall 
level of environmental protection; that is the role of the regulatory 
regime. 
To make this more concrete, imagine how a trading program 
would work with grazing on the commons. Policy-makers decide that 
the commons can sustain no more than 400 sheep grazing per year. 
The government therefore creates 400 permits, entitling the holder to 
graze one sheep for the calendar year listed on the permit. Unless the 
shepherd has a separate permit for each sheep grazing on the 
commons, she is breaking the law. The government then allocates the 
permits in some fashion (which, as noted above, will have significant 
distributional consequences) and lets trading commence. Those for 
whom grazing is most valuable will pay the highest price to buy the 
permits from those who value it less, ensuring that the commons is 
dedicated to the most valuable market use. If the cap is set 
appropriately, marketable permits achieve the same level of 
protection as command-and-control alternatives, but at a lower cost. 
The tradable-permit approach has additional benefits in the 
pollution realm. By letting the market rather than regulators 
determine individual actors’ emissions, profit-motivated agents who 
can control pollution at low cost can sell surplus allowances to higher-
cost agents at a profit. This creates an incentive to over-comply—to 
reduce emissions even more than is necessary to comply with permit 
limits. Each polluter will weigh the marginal cost of abatement 
against the cost of buying credits and then make an efficient 
individual decision. If the market price for credits is high enough, 
pollution reduction can become a profit center in its own right. 
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Initially allocating permits presents a challenge for trading, just 
as it does for pure private-property approaches. Moreover, 
constructing smoothly functioning markets is not simple. There must 
be a well-defined marketplace and enough buyers and sellers to 
support an active market. There also must be an effective currency of 
trade, one that is fungible and that reflects the desired environmental 
quality. For example, it would be a stretch to consider allowing 
coastal developers in Florida to “trade” the wetland ecosystem 
services they eliminate (such as flood control or nutrient filtering) for 
phosphorous emissions reductions in Oregon. 
Because the market decides where the allowances go after their 
initial allocation, there is a further challenge that harmful activities 
can be concentrated, creating local “hotspots” of pollution. This can 
become an environmental justice concern, for example, when 
allowances to emit hazardous air pollutants are concentrated in low-
income communities.16 
But where the environmental good (or bad, so to speak) can be 
captured in a measurable unit (whether that be tons of pollutant or 
kilos of fish), market service areas and participants are well-defined, 
and hotspots are not significant, trading programs have had 
demonstrable success in a variety of contexts, from fisheries to 
wetlands, increasing the efficiency and flexibility of prescriptive 
instruments.17 
3. FINANCIAL PENALTIES 
Short of banning an activity, the next most effective way to limit 
the behavior is to make it more expensive, whether through charges, 
taxes, or liability. By increasing the costs of polluting activities, such 
penalties discourage pollution and waste and force the polluter to 
bear the costs of her activities. To use economics language, the 
polluter internalizes the negative externalities of her behavior. Also 
known as a Pigouvian tax, this policy instrument ensures that each 
 
 16.  See Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental 
Laws and “Justice”, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 230 (1997) (“[E]nvironmental justice concerns are 
raised by the disproportionate burden of environmental hazards or undesirable land uses borne 
by low-income and minority communities.”). 
 17.  See, e.g., Alison Rieser, Prescriptions for the Commons: Environmental Scholarship 
and the Fishing Quotas Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 395 (1999) (describing U.S. 
fisheries’ “experiments with exclusive property rights, in which fisheries are managed as closed 
systems through . . . perpetual harvesting rights known as individual transferable quotas 
(‘ITQs’)”); see also James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of 
Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 614 (2000). 
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actor has a direct incentive to regulate her own behavior according to 
how valuable the polluting activities are.18 In our commons example, 
shepherds might be charged a fee per sheep for the right to graze 
each day. The fee could be shifted up or down, depending on the 
desired level of grazing. Carbon taxes, much discussed in the press at 
the moment, are a topical example of this approach. 
In theory, financial penalties offer an attractive policy 
instrument. One could levy the penalty on pollution (whether kilos of 
emissions or solid waste), on the feedstock (for example, a carbon tax 
on oil or coal), or on the final product (for example, a gas-guzzling 
car), but there are two practical obstacles. The first lies in getting the 
price right. Markets are efficient when the prices for goods accurately 
reflect their full environmental and social cost. A key aspect in 
internalizing externalities, then, is valuation. If one agrees that 
externalities should be internalized—that polluters should pay—the 
obvious question is “how much”? For example, we might all agree 
that CFC emissions harm the ozone layer, but how much monetary 
harm is caused by releasing a kilogram of CFCs? One dollar? One 
penny? One-hundredth of a penny? Because there is no market for 
the ozone layer, these values can only be estimated. Or perhaps it 
may be sufficient to focus, instead, on the level of penalty that 
changes behavior. 
The second challenge is political. As the battles in Congress over 
the budget have made clear, increasing taxes is never easy, and 
environmental charges seem to be harder still. President Clinton 
proposed a carbon tax at the start of his presidency, but the proposal 
quickly died in a hailstorm of political opposition.19 This is not to say 
that environmental taxes are never passed. They have become 
common in Europe and may be found in the United States; for 
example, on CFCs. But levying them at charges high enough to 
 
 18.  In economic terms, the penalty should be set so it equals the marginal environmental 
damage at the socially optimal level of pollution. See generally A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF 
WELFARE 172–203 (4th ed. 1932) (discussing “incidental uncharged disservices,” now called 
negative externalities, in chapter on marginal social net product); see also William J. Baumol, 
On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 308–09 (1972) (explaining 
the reciprocal nature of social costs). For a discussion of Pigouvian Tax Theory and control of 
externalities, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 21–23 (2d ed. 1988). 
 19.  See Clinton Gives Carbon Tax Thumbs Down, COAL & SYNFUELS TECH., Feb. 22, 
1993, at 2 (citing public criticism of President Clinton’s carbon tax proposal); Thomas P. Lyon, 
‘Green’ Firms Bearing Gifts, 26 REG. 36, 39 (noting that “political resistance was fast and 
powerful” to carbon tax proposals). 
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influence behavior significantly is easier said than done. In many 
cases, the charges have been intended more for revenue-raising than 
for serious behavior modification. 
4. FINANCIAL PAYMENTS 
As noted above, government can discourage certain polluting 
activities through penalties or, equally, it can use subsidies to 
encourage beneficial activities. Just as government can use penalties 
to capture negative externalities and make bad activities more 
expensive, it can use payments to capture positive externalities and 
make good activities less expensive. In our commons, shepherds 
might be paid $100 not to graze one of their sheep for a year. The 
shepherd is effectively being paid for not exercising her right to graze. 
In one example of this approach, California has embarked on a major 
program of tax benefits for property owners who install solar panels.20 
Paying “cash for clunkers” to get high-polluting older cars off the 
road is another example,21 as is paying agricultural subsidies to 
farmers for setting aside cropland to prevent erosion or provide 
wildlife habitat.22 This is the approach behind the popular strategy of 
payments for ecosystem services.23 
Not all payment schemes benefit the environment, however. 
Quite the opposite, since many government subsidies actually 
encourage harmful activities. The Green Scissors Report, published 
annually by an alliance of environmental and conservative groups, 
identifies billions of dollars in subsidies whose elimination would both 
help the environment and reduce the federal budget deficit (such as 
subsidies for building logging roads on public lands).24 In certain 
respects, perverse subsidies cost us twice—first, when we pay the 
initial tax to raise the funds needed for the subsidy and second, when 
we suffer the environmental damage encouraged by the subsidy. 
 
 20. See David R. Baker, State’s Systems Top 1 Gigawatt Level, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 11, 2013, 
at C1 (“California’s rebate program for businesses and homeowners who install solar panels has 
now funded enough systems to generate 1 gigawatt of electricity . . . .”). 
 21.  See e.g., ‘Cash for Clunkers’ Runs on Empty, STAR-NEWS, Aug. 1, 2009, at 1A (noting 
failure of federal “cash for clunkers” program).  
 22. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3831–3835a (2012) (codifying agricultural subsidies). 
 23.  See, e.g., James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the 
Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870 (2005); J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM 
SERVICES (2007). 
 24.  GREEN SCISSORS, http://www.greenscissors.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2013). 
Salzman (Do Not Delete) 5/7/2013  11:17 AM 
Spring 2013] THE FIVE P’S 373 
5. PERSUASION 
If prescriptive regulation and market instruments represent “hard” 
regulatory approaches, then a softer approach may be found in laws 
requiring information production and dissemination. Sometimes 
described as reflexive laws, the theory behind such approaches is that 
the government can change people’s behavior by forcing them to think 
about the harm they are causing and by publicizing that harm.25 In the 
context of the commons, the government might require shepherds to 
record and publish the number of sheep they graze, the amount of 
forage the sheep eat, or the days before the commons can no longer 
support grazing. The government also may try to educate the shepherds 
with brochures or presentations on the causes and dangers of 
overgrazing, or may sponsor a pilot project that demonstrates more 
effective ways to manage the commons. 
The best-known example in the United States would be the 
environmental impact assessments required under the National 
Environmental Policy Act. Requirements that agencies or developers 
prepare an environmental assessment for activities with significant 
impacts may be found all over the globe at local, national, and 
international levels.26 
Information-based approaches are often used when there is 
inadequate political support to impose market or regulatory 
instruments, or when such instruments are ill-suited to the problem. In 
a number of cases, particularly in the case of pollution, requirements to 
collect and disseminate information have led to significant changes in 
the behavior of regulated parties, even in the absence of overt 
prescriptive regulation. The Toxic Release Inventory, for example, 
simply requires manufacturers who emit a number of substances to 
monitor, measure, and publicly report their annual emissions.27 Whether 
because of “naming-and-shaming,” measuring emissions for the first 
time, or heightened consciousness, this persuasive instrument has led to 
significant reductions in emissions without the threat of fines or 
 
 25.  See generally Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV 1227 
(1995). 
 26.  See, e.g., California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–
21189.3 (West 2013) (local level); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–
4370(h) (2012) (national level); Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309 (international level). 
 27.  42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2013); see also Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program, ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/tri/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2013) (featuring searchable 
database of facilities disposing of toxic chemicals). 
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penalties. Persuasion instruments can also be used to “nudge” behavior 
toward energy efficiency, for example, by providing smiley-face 
encouragement on utility bills for better conservation than your 
neighbors.28 
PUTTING THE TOOLKIT TO WORK 
While the examples above have used the case of grazing on the 
commons, one can apply this toolkit of regulatory instruments to 
virtually any environmental problem.29 Taking climate change as an 
example, consider the range of legal instruments you could use to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, as well as their potential 
shortcomings. If you were head of the EPA, what would your proposed 
greenhouse gas reduction strategy look like? 
Prescriptive regulation could take the form of emission controls, 
limiting the amount of greenhouse gases a source may emit. 
Regulations might mandate the use of certain pollution control 
technologies or other process design requirements (often referred to as 
best available technology or BAT).30 
Financial penalties seem like a good potential fit as well. You could 
levy emission fees based on the amount of greenhouse gases emitted. 
These would encourage each actor to look for ways to reduce her 
emissions and to change her behavior according to how valuable the 
polluting activities are.31 Conversely, you could rely on payments, 
providing tax credits for research and development on energy efficient 
technologies or tax deductions for energy-efficient purchases. You 
could even remove subsidies for oil and coal exploration. 
Relying on property rights, you could establish a trading market 
for greenhouse gases. In the typical cap-and-trade-program for 
 
 28.  Mark Joseph Stern, A Little Guilt, A Lot of Energy Savings: How Smiley Faces and 
Peer Pressure Can Save Money—and the Planet, SLATE (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/the_efficient_planet/2013/03/opower_using_smiley_fac
es_and_peer_pressure_to_save_the_planet.html; RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, 
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
 29.  Professor Melinda Benson, who used this model in class, has suggested a sixth P–
Protest. It is not a likely strategy for governmental actions, but is a nice extension to non-state 
actors. Email from Melinda Harm Benson, Assistant Professor, University of New Mexico, to 
Author (Aug. 7, 2012) (on file with author). 
 30. See, e.g., Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71) 
(subjecting certain stationary sources to best available control technology standards). 
 31.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Rosenthal, Carbon Taxes Make Ireland Even Greener, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 28, 2012, at A1 (highlighting ways that Irish citizens have changed their environmental 
behavior as a result of taxes on fossil fuels). 
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pollution, policymakers would establish a socially desirable level of 
aggregate greenhouse gas emissions, determine a formula for initial 
allocation of emissions among sources, and issue or auction permits to 
members of the regulated community that entitle each bearer to emit a 
given quantity of that pollutant. The political battle would focus on the 
overall cap, how allocations are distributed, and which emitters are 
included in the trading market.32 
Finally, persuasion through information disclosure might work 
well. You could, for example, require firms to collect and publish data 
on their greenhouse gas emissions on the web. Similarly, you might 
create an eco-labeling program, providing a seal of approval for those 
companies or goods that achieve significant greenhouse gas 
reductions.33 The goal behind such programs is to provide green 
consumers with reliable information on which to base their purchases 
and favor environmentally friendlier companies in the marketplace. 
You could also promote websites that allow people to calculate their 
carbon footprint.34 
The Five P’s could also apply to conserving an endangered species, 
perhaps a rare bird. Prescriptive regulation might ban actions that kill 
or harm the birds, or degrade their habitat.35 Property rights could be 
used to create a trading program where breeding pairs became the 
currency of exchange—landowners who modified their habitat so it was 
less attractive to the birds could mitigate their actions by purchasing 
credit for breeding pairs that had been established by entrepreneurs in 
other areas. This “species banking” could create an incentive for 
entrepreneurs to convert farmland, for example, into endangered 
species habitat.36 Financial penalties could be imposed on landowners 
who make habitat less attractive to local endangered species. 
Conversely, payments could be made to landowners who improve 
 
 32. See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (as passed by House of Representatives, June 26, 2009) (proposing emissions trading 
program); see also John M. Broder, House Passes Bill to Address Threat of Climate Change, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2009, at A1 (outlining politically disputed portions of Waxman-Markey 
legislation). 
 33.  See, e.g., ECOLABEL INDEX, http://www.ecolabelindex.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2013) 
(providing global ecolabel information to “increas[e] transparency and help[] buyers and sellers 
use them more effectively”). 
 34.  See, e.g., What’s My Carbon Footprint?, NATURE CONSERVANCY, 
http://www.nature.org/greenliving/carboncalculator/index.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2013) 
(allowing users to calculate their carbon footprints). 
 35. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2012) (making it unlawful to “take” any endangered species). 
 36.  See About Us, SPECIESBANKING.COM, http://global.speciesbanking.com/pages/ 
about_us (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (explaining concept of species banking). 
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habitat to make it more attractive to breeding pairs. And persuasion 
could be used by highlighting the natural heritage of local biodiversity. 
To be sure, this framework cannot perfectly capture the dizzying 
range of all environmental policy. The vast majority of instruments, 
however, do fit easily within the Five P’s framework. As a result, a 
teacher can easily share the broad range of policy options with 
students. They, in turn, can then assess which instrument or 
combination of instruments best fits the particular situation. Using the 
Five P’s approach in the classroom can make the taxonomy, relative 
strengths, and comparative weaknesses of instrument choices clear to 
students.  
Based on the experience of the DELPF editors and my former 
students over the years, the details of Section 9 of the Endangered 
Species Act or the liability requirements under Superfund fade away 
soon after the course ends. The Five P’s, though, have stayed with them. 
If their experience is any guide, the Five P’s framework can strengthen 
students’ understanding of environmental law and policy in a simple 
manner they are likely to remember long after their final exam. 
